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This paper examines the channels through which alternative property rights 
institutions affect investment. These institutions are defined by a society’s 
enforced laws, regulations, governance mechanisms and norms concerning the 
use of resources. A transaction cost framework is used to analyze the incentive 
impact of various types of property rights, liability rules, and rules regarding 
contracts. This framework is used to discuss the legal and cultural conditions 
necessary for the formation of productivity-enhancing organizations and the 
proper role of government in providing the infrastructure for private investment. 
A brief section examines the role of cultural and religious norms in determining 
the economic effectiveness of legal systems, with a focus on Islamic countries. 
The final section evaluates empirical approaches used to discover the specific 
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Introduction 
This paper discusses property rights, the contractual arrangements made possible by those rights, 
and their effects on investment and growth. Property rights are broadly defined as the set of laws and 
customs, or formal and informal rules, that determine how individuals may gain access to resources and the 
range of possible uses they may make of them. They include rights and obligations with respect to the use, 
maintenance and improvement of resources, the rules of exchange or contract, and rules of liability when a 
particular use of a resource by one individual comes into conflict with the rights of other individuals. 
Property rights determine who gets to make decisions about resource use, and define the incentives faced 
by individuals with claims against these resources. The structure of incentives created by a society’s 
property rights regime will determine the degree of specialization in productive activities and hence the 
overall productivity of an economy. If property rights are improperly defined or left ambiguous and 
unenforced, resources will be wasted as people try to capture or defend their claims to resources.  
The paper is divided into five sections. The first section outlines an overall framework indicating 
the possible channels through which property rights affect investment. It also provides a general taxonomy 
of types of property rights institutions and their effects on individual incentives for production and 
investment. It examines why different property rights arrangements may be established and the conditions 
under which these arrangements may or may not be efficient. 
The second section discusses the links between property rights, transaction costs and contracts. 
How property rights are defined and enforced determines the range of possible transactions people may 
make with each other to take advantage of the benefits of specialization and teamwork. The legal regime 
defining and enforcing property rights and rules of liability affects transaction costs and thus the likelihood 
that resources will be directed to higher-valued uses. This section examines various dimensions of 
transaction costs and how property, contract and liability law may be structured to reduce them. 
Often complex production activities can only be achieved through the creation of organizations or 
firms, which may be conceived as networks of contracts that allow specific resource owners, the owners of 
capital, to obtain control over a variety of other resources, particularly labor. The key message of this 
section is that firms can reduce many of the transaction costs associated with the complex market 
exchanges necessary to take advantage of economies of scale and scope [Coase 1937].  But the ability of   4
private entrepreneurs to create efficient-sized firms requires stable property rights and contract 
enforcement, well-functioning credit and input markets, the absence of intrusive external interference in the 
firms’ affairs, and low-cost access to necessary public goods. Success depends on being able to form 
efficient and enforceable contracts with outside suppliers, employees and creditors. We will discuss how 
the rules and restrictions governing these contracts will determine the size and nature of the activities of 
firms and the level and efficiency of their investments. 
 The third section focuses on the role of the government in promoting or hindering efficient private 
investments. Governments help provide the legal environment necessary for the functioning of markets and 
firms. A government may be considered as the set of organizations that define and enforce property rights, 
enact rules and regulations, and, in many instances, produce goods and services that the private sector may 
not be willing to supply in socially optimum quantities.  The key message of this section is that government 
regulations, and the willingness and ability of the state to enforce them, tend to redefine, clarify or 
obfuscate property rights, as do different degrees of state enforcement of contracts. Regulations that clarify 
property rights, reduce transaction costs and encourage competition will promote growth while regulations 
that create unnecessary transaction costs in the private sector will impair its growth. Similarly, state 
production of goods and services may be complementary to, or an inefficient substitute for, private 
production.  
The fourth section discusses the importance of cultural factors in promoting or retarding 
investment. The cultural environment defines peoples’ beliefs about right and wrong, and thus their 
willingness to follow or violate social rules. Strong beliefs about the morality of specific rules will affect 
individuals’ willingness to comply with them and even to incur personal costs to privately enforce them. 
Religion is the central cultural institution in many countries and affects individual beliefs about the validity 
or morality of legal rules and social norms. In recent decades religious influence has been rising in many 
countries, particularly in Islamic countries where the Sharia or Islamic law has become increasingly 
influential. The Sharia has a well developed body of laws about property and contracts and there is some 
controversy over whether these codes hinder or promote commercial and industrial development in the 
countries that adhere to them. This section will evaluate some of these arguments. Does the application of 
the Islamic tradition to law tend to promote efficient property rights arrangements, or do countries trying to   5
make their commercial laws consistent with Sharia doctrine face greater barriers to growth? What kinds of 
investments are encouraged or discouraged by the institutions affected by this tradition? 
The final section of the paper examines some of the attempts to test empirically the general 
framework discussed above and to measure the impact of different institutional structures on economic 
performance.  
 
I. Property Rights and Incentives 
Property rights represent the formal and informal claims and obligations of individuals against the 
resources of a society. The way property rights are defined and enforced will affect not only the efficiency 
of resource use, and the levels and types of investments made, but also the allocation of risk and the 
distribution of income. Property rights systems evolve for complex reasons as individuals and groups vie 
for resources and struggle to reach cooperative agreements to reduce conflict, to promote production or to 
control risk.  Thus the property rights that eventually emerge in any society need not be and most often are 
not wealth maximizing. Other factors such as reduction of risk or the creation and maintenance of a certain 
distribution of wealth and power may also be determining factors. These aspects are often in conflict. 
Wealth maximization requires that resources be controlled by those who can extract maximum value from 
them, while reducing risk often involves sharing output and reduced incentives for effort and investment. 
The emergence of private property rights may create more risk for individuals but better incentives. 
However the full potential of these incentives for investment and innovation will not come to fruition 
unless it is possible to mitigate some of this risk through diversification and insurance. Otherwise risk-
averse individuals will be induced to undertake many risk-mitigating actions that might limit potential 
growth-enhancing investments as individuals refrain from exposing their fortunes to loss in high risk but 
high return activities. That is why limited liability laws and bankruptcy statutes, by limiting the risks to 
individual investors, are considered important for encouraging investment in these kinds of investments. 
Property rights may also emerge (or be imposed) to promote a certain distribution of power and 
wealth. A ruling coalition may be reluctant to adopt wealth maximizing rules if such rules would reduce the 
wealth and power of members of the coalition.  Devising and enforcing Pareto-superior rules are often not 
possible due to high political transaction costs, the costs of forming new coalitions, negotiating with other   6
coalitions and enforcing new sets of more efficient rules [Eggerston 1990; North 1990]. Thus Douglass 
North writes that institutions (which he defines as the societal rules constraining individual behavior) 
“were-and are- always a mixed bag of those that induce productivity increase and those that reduce 
productivity.”
2 The degree to which property rights and other institutions promote productive activity and 
discourage redistributive and unproductive activities will determine the overall productivity and growth of 
an economy. 
Property rights are often complex and attenuated in various ways. The complexity of property 
rights is due in part to the varied nature of different resources and the multiplicity of their uses and effects.  
Measuring the multidimensional potential effects of different uses on different individuals explains, in part, 
why property rights are often not defined and enforced in a complete way [Barzel 1989]. If actions and 
their effects were easily observable and verifiable, then it would be possible, in principle, for those in 
authority to define rights and obligations in such a precise way that those who use resources would bear the 
full costs and benefits of their actions and thus would be induced to act efficiently. However, since the uses 
and effects of resource use cannot be measured at low cost, property rights are often ambiguous and certain 
resources or their uses are left ambiguous and effectively in the public domain. This means that people will 
have incentives to try to “capture” their potential value by expending resources in predatory or defensive 
actions or in simply overusing and wasting these particular resources.
3  
Property rights are always in constant flux. Who maintains or acquires which rights depends on an 
individual’s own efforts to protect a given right (say by securing boundaries against trespass), collective 
enforcement, and the efforts of others to capture one’s rights.
4  Property rights may be obtained through 
usurpation or agreement. Once obtained, they must be protected by collective and private enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Individual claims against resources always involve some combination of communal and private 
property rights. Most often, individuals will need to combine the resources under their control and reach 
agreements with other resource “owners” to achieve reasonable productivity.  For example, a farmer who 
has acquired the right to cultivate a piece of land, and has private ownership of a few farm animals, will 
                                                 
2 North, Ibid. 
3 Barzel, p. 3. 
4 Ibid. p.2.    7
need access to water, tools, seeds, the labor of others, and access to grazing fields, in order to realize the 
full potential of his resources. Water may be available as an open-access resource or as a regulated 
common resource; tools and seeds may be borrowed from neighbors or bought in a market; help from 
others may be obtained through a market for labor or through communal conventions and norms of 
reciprocal aid; and grazing fields may be obtained through communal use rights. How rights are defined 
with respect to each of these resources, who controls them and how their use can be transferred to others, 
will determine the structure of incentives and the efficiency of resource use. The benefits of defining and 
enforcing rights more precisely rises as populations expand, economies grow and resources become more 
scarce. Whether in fact such restructuring of rights occurs will depend on the relative abilities of potential 
winners and losers for effective political action. What follows is a brief outline of a general framework 
describing the various channels through which property rights affect investment. Following that, a brief 
classification of types of property rights and the circumstances under which such rights might produce 
economically efficient outcomes will be presented. 
 
A. General  Framework   
Property rights determine investment by affecting its expected returns. Because property rights are 
complex and multidimensional, they affect expected returns through a number of distinct but interrelated 
channels. These include the following: 
  
1.  Security of property rights is the most often cited channel for promoting investment. More secure 
rights generally lead to lower expected expropriation and higher net returns. Following Besley 
[1995] we can think of this expectation of expropriation as an expected (random) tax on returns. 
Investments may be expropriated through theft, fraud, confiscation or taxation. Insecure property 
rights also affect the expected variability of expropriation.  For any given expected expropriation 
level, there may be higher or lower variability.  Uncertainty of expropriation affects the 
uncertainty of returns and tends to discourage investment for risk-averse decision makers. When 
property rights are insecure, potentially less efficient investments may also be undertaken as a 
means to strengthen the security of property rights. [See Deininger and Feder 2000].    8
2.   A second factor affecting investment is the degree of transferability of property, through gift, 
bequest, rent or sale. Higher transferability may increase the expected returns from investment in 
many ways. First, it gives greater utility of returns to the investor by allowing him to bequeath a 
larger estate to his heirs. It also means that the value of improvements in property can be realized 
through sale. And finally, when circumstances warrant property can be transferred to those who 
can make better use of it, that is, those who can make more efficient investments. The possibility 
for transfer of resource rights will not be desirable if there is the possibility of negative external 
effects on others in the community. Hence resources might be made inalienable or require the 
consent of the authorities in the community. As economic development proceeds and contracts 
with the world outside a community become more lucrative, such constraints on transfer might 
retard investment and productivity. [see Binswanger et. al. 1995]. 
3.   The types of investments that can be undertaken depend on the ability of owners to borrow capital 
at relatively low cost. The ability to use property as collateral reduces the cost of borrowing and 
encourages investment. This ability depends on the degree to which the legal system and social 
norms protect and enforce financial contracts. Formalization and registration of property rights 
generally reduce the costs of making and enforcing financial contracts by making it easier to 
transfer assets in case of default [DeSoto 1989, 2000]. In addition, formal titles to property lower 
the costs to lenders for determining the credit-worthiness of borrowers. 
4.   The return to investment also depends on the degree to which property owners can obtain access 
to common property resources and public goods at reasonable cost. Laws, regulations and customs 
determining the conditions for access to common property affect the returns to investment by 
allowing fuller utilization of resource complementarities.  Similarly, if governments are able to 
provide the requisite public goods and infrastructure, the returns to private investments will rise.   
5.   Returns to investment also depend on the ability to make deals with other property owners such as 
customers, creditors, potential shareholders, workers and suppliers. Such deals can be made at 
relatively low cost if private competitive markets for these goods and services exist. But 
informational asymmetries, the possibilities for hidden actions and strategic behavior, and 
potential monopolization may make such costs high or threaten the existence of such markets.   9
Whether markets exist and how effectively they function in providing resources at competitive 
cost depend on the institutions (laws, regulations and customs) that have evolved or been 
established to reduce uncertainty, foster trust and prevent monopolization.  
6.   The exercise of property rights by one or more people may impose costs on others and high 
transaction costs may prevent an efficient resolution of these potential conflicts through 
negotiation. Private investments in redistributive activities or in activities that involve significant 
negative externalities tend to reduce the returns and value of property to others. Institutions that 
facilitate the internalization of externalities and reduce the returns to redistributive (or rent-
seeking) activities tend to strengthen overall property rights and increase the returns to productive 
investment. Therefore government regulations, court-imposed liability rules and externality taxes 
that are socially cost effective (where the benefits of the harms prevented exceed the costs of 
implementation and compliance) may increase growth-enhancing investments. Ideally, we would 
need to specify a social welfare function in order to determine social costs and benefits. 
 
A society’s property rights institutions include all of its enforced laws, regulations and customs 
that affect resource use. These institutions together will help determine the degree to which costs and 
benefits of actions are internalized and thus the incentives for productive investment. Different historical 
and technological circumstances will require different sets of institutions and property rights to generate 
growth-enhancing investments. Under each set of circumstances, strictly private rights should be given to 
some resources while other resources should combine elements of common property and regulation. Some 
resources should be protected by liability rules while other resources should be protected by property rules 
or full rights of exclusion. What follows is a general taxonomy of types of property rights and the 
conditions under which each might be appropriate. 
 
B.  Brief Taxonomy of Property Rights 
1.  Open-Access Communal Resources  
Open-access communal resources are resources that may be used by members of a community in 
an unrestricted way. Such property rights are appropriate under two conditions: when a resource is non-  10
scarce (when demand is less than availability at zero price); and when a resource is scarce but the costs of 
exclusion (that is, the costs of defining boundaries or other ways of limiting access) exceed the benefits of 
exclusion (reductions in the harmful effects of overuse). Open access resources include many of the 
resources in the ocean, community parks, sidewalks, roads and certain kinds of knowledge. Public goods in 
general, with high costs of exclusion and little rivalry in use, fall into this category.  Even if there is rivalry 
or subtractability in use, it may still be efficient to maintain open access rules if the nature of the resource is 
such that exclusion is technically very costly.  Highways during rush hour are an example of such an open 
access resource.
5 
Exclusion may sometimes be technically possible but undesirable because of non-rivalry or low 
marginal costs of use. Goods subject to increasing returns (natural monopolies) fall in this category. The 
government may have to subsidize the production or regulate the use of such goods to ensure access at low 
cost. However if creating exclusive private rights will create sufficiently better incentives for innovation 
and the creation of new products, then it may be appropriate to define and enforce exclusive private rights. 
Such circumstances provide the rationale for private ownership of natural monopolies and for the creation 
of intellectual property rights. Intellectual property rights will be harmful if they are too broadly defined so 
that the marginal benefits of restricted access (new knowledge and inventions) are less than the marginal 
costs (reduced access to products with high marginal value but low marginal costs of use).  
 
2.  Restricted Access Common Resources 
As demand for scarce or “rivalrous” common resources increases, the costs of open access may 
become too great relative to the benefits. Some social mechanism encouraging conservation becomes 
desirable to avoid the familiar “tragedy of the commons” [Hardin, 1968]. Social norms and traditions may 
evolve to induce people to limit use at various margins and to invest in the upkeep of the resource, thus 
internalizing the externalities to some extent. In addition, some collective governance authority may be 
created to impose and enforce specific rules and regulations restricting use [Ostrom 1990]. Enforcement of 
these rules will be easier if violations are readily observable, and are more likely to be “reported” and 
                                                 
5 Even though Barzel [1989] claims that the gasoline tax is an indirect and imperfect but perhaps efficient 
way of excluding people from overuse of roads.   11
punished. Thus the customary rules of “local commons” are more likely to be effective than rules imposed 
on more extensive commons at the regional, national and international level. [Seabright, 1993; Ostrom, 
1990]. Nevertheless there may be many circumstances when sophisticated and costly monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms may be worthwhile if the costs of non-enforcement are high enough.  
The incentive problems associated with managing common resources apply not only to resources 
traditionally subject to communal ownership, such as grazing lands, fisheries, aquifers, wells and oil 
reserves, but also to sets of resources committed to common management by voluntary (and sometimes 
involuntary and coercive) agreements, such as the resources under the control of households, firms, non-
profit organizations and governments. Section three below will discuss the nature of organizations, the 
reasons for their formation, and the methods with which they deal with their particular incentive problems.  
3.   Usufructs 
When the costs associated with communal governance rise sufficiently (or the costs of drawing and 
enforcing boundaries fall sufficiently), it may become efficient to divide up a resource into different 
segments under individual control. Such rights to use (but not transfer) land or other resources are called 
usufruct rights.
6  Compared to a communal arrangement it may be easier to defend boundaries against 
trespassers and monitoring of users becomes less important. Many of the externalities associated with 
communal use are internalized. While nuisance externalities may still be imposed on neighbors, the cost of 
negotiating adjustments with them may be low in settings where accepted social norms and customs help 
define the range of acceptable actions and help the parties settle disputes [Ellickson 1986].  
Usufructs may still result in underinvestment and overexploitation since some of the benefits of 
investment are not transferable to potential buyers or to one’s descendants, while some of the costs of 
overexploitation may be passed on to future users.  Nevertheless usufructs may be preferable to full private 
ownership under certain conditions. These conditions are most likely to occur when a resource is not very 
susceptible to improvement by investment or damage by use. Usufructs are appropriate if the possibility of 
transfer will inflict expected harm to third parties by enough to counteract the potential gains from transfer. 
Thus if economic circumstances change such that the expected gains from transfer (including exchange) 
                                                 
6 If transfer rights are included it may be said that full private property rights exist, even though, as will be 
seen below, private property is never absolute and almost always involves many restrictions and 
obligations.    12
increase sufficiently, it may be more efficient to convert usufructs into transferable private property. In 
European history usufructs in land were gradually transformed into private property as capitalism grew and 
took hold [See Hicks 1969]. In modern developing countries similar transformations have occurred as 
commerce has expanded. In certain developing countries land titles are uncertain and possession is 
accompanied by usufruct rights. The theory suggests that when commercial possibilities expand sufficiently 
to significantly increase the potential gains from transfer, these properties should be transformed into 
private property. However if tribal and other local connections are sufficiently important, such transfer 
rights might pose a threat to the community and transferability might be restricted.  
Note that the concept of use-rights is not confined to land. Anytime a resource is made inalienable 
we have a kind of usufruct, the right to use but not to sell.  Rose-Ackerman [1985] observes that 
inalienability is and has been pervasive in all societies. The efficiency rationale for inalienability is 
considered a second-best response to market failures arising from externalities, asymmetries of information 
and coordination costs.
7 Inalienability rules may even make markets work better in certain circumstances. 
Modern laws preventing owners or their agents from giving away assets during bankruptcy proceedings 




4.  Private Property Rights 
With the growth of market opportunities, the costs of having usufructs and prohibiting sale may 
become too great and alienability might be allowed. With full private property rights, incentives become 
stronger while greater opportunities are opened up for more complex contractual exchanges and greater 
specialization. All of this of course presumes the existence of competition among private owners.  
Full private property rights, however constrained, generally involve the freedom from 
expropriation, the right of sale or transfer, and the right to use a property as collateral. When transfer is 
possible the property may be sold to individuals who may be able to use it in a better way or to extract 
more income from it. This means that the original owner will be able to recoup the value of any 
                                                 
7 Rose-Ackerman, p. 200. 
8 Ibid. p. 202.   13
investments or improvements he has made in the property in case he decides to pursue better opportunities. 
Similarly if the property can be used as collateral owners may borrow resources to take advantage of 
investment opportunities.  
De Soto [2000] provides a more detailed analysis of the importance of “formalization” of private 
property rights in complex market economies. By formal property he means property rights that are 
documented and protected by the state. Assets would be registered, with their most important attributes 
(including restrictions such as easements and encumbrances) written down and recorded. Thus ownership is 
made more secure and transaction costs are reduced as strangers are able to more easily trace and validate 
the attributes of assets without actually having to see them. The flow of information and communication 
about assets and their potential uses improves. Formal property is more easily acceptable as collateral, 
allowing owners to mortgage their assets to obtain loans for investment. When the legal system allows easy 
and secure transfer of assets, opportunities for new investments are opened up and assets and resources get 
guided to their most valued uses.
9 
 
5.   Restrictions on Private Property Rights  
Despite the obvious private incentive advantages of absolute and fully secure private property 
rights for many assets, restrictions are almost always placed on the rights of private owners due to the 
potential harms that particular uses may inflict on others. If these harms could be precisely measured at low 
cost, precise fees could be imposed to internalize the externalities. If harms cannot be precisely measured, 
then quantity regulations on more measurable proxies for the externalities may be more appropriate. 
[Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001]. 
The right of eminent domain is another example of a restriction of a private property right. The 
right of eminent domain allows the government to “take” private property for valuable public purposes 
often in return for “reasonable compensation.”
 10 Eminent domain is considered necessary because of the 
                                                 
9 As is well known, what are considered “most-valued uses” depend in large part on the initial allocation of 
endowments and rights. 
10 Fischel [1995] has an excellent discussion of what are known as “regulatory takings.” Changes in 
government regulations may severely depress the values of certain private properties making it analogous 
to the actual physical taking of private property. Fischel addresses the issue of compensation for such 
“takings.” Of course in normal circumstances people whose property values are diminished by government   14
high transaction costs that might occur if the government tried to voluntarily purchase all the properties it 
needs for a particular project. One holdout could potentially block a valuable project or make it 
prohibitively expensive. Potential sellers might be tempted to hold out in the hopes of obtaining a better 
price. Potential hold-up problems are in fact one major cause of high transaction costs, especially when 
many parties are involved. Allowing the government to force the sale may thus be potentially efficient. 
Requiring compensation for the original owners is not technically necessary from a Kaldor-Hicks 
perspective. In this view takings are justified if the social benefits outweigh the foregone benefits to the 
original owners, and the payment of compensation might even be considered to be an unnecessary 
administrative expense. According to the Pareto criterion, however, compensation would be necessary to 
increase the likelihood that no one is made worse off. Compensation is also desirable if it constrains 
government officials from undertaking inefficient and low-valued projects. Finally compensation might be 
considered to be ethically fair in that the costs of public projects are not disproportionately borne by 
particular individuals and are more widely shared through the tax system. [See Shavell 2003]. In this 
context, taking property without compensation involves what Michelman calls “demoralization costs” or 
“the sum of utility losses to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the realization that no 
compensation is offered” as well as the resulting disincentive effects and social disruption costs that may 
arise.
11  
Eminent domain in fact is just one example of situations where the community allows intrusion 
into the property rights of others, with or without the payment of compensation. In such cases we may say 
that property is protected by a liability rule rather than a property rule. How property is protected depends 
in large measure on the potential for alternative uses, the externalities that the use of the property may 




                                                                                                                                                 
regulations are not compensated for their losses due in part to the huge bureaucratic costs that would be 
involved.  
11 Cited in Fischel, pp. 144-145. Michelman proposes that compensation should be paid if the net social 
benefits of the taking exceed the administrative costs of compensation, and if demoralization costs exceed 
settlement costs. Otherwise compensation should not be paid. This rule should theoretically apply to all 
kind of government takings.     15
C. Protecting  Entitlements  with  Liability Rules or Property Rules 
In their celebrated work on conflicting use or externality situations, Calabresi and Melamed [1972] 
analyze the rationales for different methods of protecting property rights. Once an individual is given an 
entitlement to use a resource, society must decide on the type of protection it will give in case the 
entitlement is infringed. A property rule punishes trespassers with criminal penalties.  With a property rule, 
the only way for someone to gain access to someone else’s property is through voluntary exchange or 
transfer. Sometimes, however, it might be more desirable to protect an entitlement with a liability rule. A 
liability rule protects against trespass by imposing damages.  
According to Calabresi and Melamed, the reason for protecting property rights with different rules 
is the existence of transaction costs. If transaction costs are zero, externalities and conflicting uses will be 
internalized and we obtain the very Coasian result that it will not matter by which rule property is 
protected: in both cases the parties involved will end up reaching an agreement and using resources in the 
most efficient way. However with high transaction costs, the choice of a particular rule will matter. Recall 
that Coase [1960] showed that if transaction costs are positive and there is a conflict over resource use, 
courts should try to give the property rights to the party who values it most, or make liable the party who 
can avoid the externality at lower cost. Similarly Calabresi and Melamed show that if transaction costs are 
high, the particular way entitlements are protected is important in guiding resources to their highest valued 
uses. If initial endowments do not rest with those who value them the most, the only way to get resources to 
the “right” people is through either a voluntary or an involuntary transfer. High transaction costs will often 
preclude voluntary transfers. One way to allow an efficient “involuntary” transfer is to allow the party that 
potentially values the resource more highly to “take” it in return for the payment of compensatory damages. 
If a reasonably precise value for these damages could be determined by courts or regulators at low cost, 
then liability rule protection would lead to the efficient result. If not, then liability rule protection might 
open the door to inefficient abuse of property rights and much predatory and defensive action.  
The power of eminent domain is considered a liability rule because it allows the government to 
take private property, usually on condition that it pays appropriate (market value) compensation.
12 Liability 
                                                 
12 Governments may even transfer their eminent domain authority to private firms as when the U.S. 
government granted eminent domain rights to railroad companies in the 19
th century.   16
rules are also important when property rights are violated accidentally or inadvertently. The requirement 
that compensation be paid may induce more precaution and care by the potential violator. If no 
compensation is required for such harms, we may say that the property right over that particular “attribute” 
is given to the potential injurer. This may be desirable if the expected harm is low relative to the expected 
benefits and if requiring compensation would involve high administrative costs. 
  Bebchuk [2001] builds on Calabresi and Melamed’s analysis of entitlement rules by examining 
how different specifications of entitlements affect the ex ante investment decisions of the parties involved 
in a conflicting use situation, by affecting the ex post distribution of surplus (defined as the sum of the net 
returns to the parties). Note that in C&M’s model, following Coase, the ex post distribution of surplus 
would not affect resource allocation or the equilibrium levels of activities of the various parties (assuming 
zero wealth effects). Bebchuk assumes that ex ante bargaining is difficult so that complete multi-period 
contracts specifying all actions cannot be enacted and enforced, but that ex post bargaining over any 
payments one side must make to the other is costless. He also assumes that bargaining power of each party 
depends on the initial entitlements they have obtained. As a result, the ex post distribution of surplus will 
be affected by the ex ante actions of the (two) parties, encompassing investments in productive, polluting 
and harm-reducing activities. An entitlement rule which affects ex post distribution of surplus will affect ex 
ante incentives to invest.
13   
  By way of illustration, Bebchuk considers various scenarios involving two companies, a resort (R) 
and a factory (F), both needing to use a body of water, one for entertainment, the other for pollution. He 
shows what will happen with different entitlement rules given some reasonable assumptions about ex post 
bargaining power. If R is given a property right to enjoin F from polluting, then R will over-invest, while F 
will under-invest. If R is given liability rule protection, it will over-invest by even more than it would under 
a property rule because it would have no incentives to undertake harm reducing investments; under this 
rule, F will have efficient incentives to invest because it will be able to keep the value of its investments ex 
post. If F has property rule protection, it will tend to over-invest, while R will tend to under-invest.  
Bebchek concludes that the optimum entitlement rule depends on many parameters involving the 
propensities of the parties to over-invest or under-invest in various circumstances. He also suggests that the 
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menu of alternative rules should be expanded to include liability rules based on “super-compensatory 
damages” and “under-compensatory damages.”
14 Thus, for example, if R has liability rule protection and is 
therefore likely to over-invest, then under-compensatory damages might produce a better result. Another 
significant factor that has to be taken into account is the informational requirements placed on the courts or 
regulatory agencies. In general, property rule protections have far less informational requirements than 
liability rule protections. But property rule protection for resources might prove to be socially costly if the 
initial allocation of entitlements rests with those who have low-valued uses and if transaction costs are 
high. Here a liability rule requiring the payment of compensatory damages might be better.
15 But as seen 
above, fully compensatory damage payments might be inefficient in a bilateral investment situation since 
the potential victim might not undertake adequate harm-reducing investments. A general externality tax on 
the “injurer” might achieve a better result (if administratively feasible at low cost) by inducing both the 
injurer and the victim to internalize the external costs involved. Here the victim will not receive any 
payment and thus will be induced to undertake cost-effective harm reducing investments to protect himself.  
 
II. Transaction Costs, Contracts and Organizations 
  As indicated above, any initial distribution of property rights is unlikely to be fully efficient. 
Resources may not be under the control of those who value them most, or who have the skills, knowledge 
and initiative to extract the most value out of them. Potentially, there are three basic ways to move toward a 
more efficient arrangement: voluntary exchanges of entitlements or contract; involuntary taking by private 
or public actors; or a spontaneous evolution in conventions and norms relating to the use patterns of a 
resource.  
Contracts are mutually binding promises to undertake explicit or implicit actions over time. They 
are a means to promote specialization, teamwork and specialized (relationship-specific) investments. The 
kinds of contracts private owners of resources or their agents may make with each other will depend on the 
                                                 
14 Ibid. p. 50. 
15 Such was the logic of the court in the famous case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. [1970]. Neighbors 
of the cement factory had sought injunctive relief according to the usual remedy under common law. But 
the court ruled that such a remedy could potentially shut down the plant at great cost to itself and the 
community. Thus the plant was allowed to continue operation subject to the payment of damages to the 
community.   18
laws and norms governing contracts. Some potential contracts will be allowed and some will not; some will 
be enforced if breached by one of the parties while others will not. Ideally the institutions of society will 
promote all mutually beneficial contracts with net gains to society (those contracts where the net gains to 
the parties involved, including transaction costs, are greater than any external costs associated with the 
contract), while discouraging contracts that may have net costs to society.   
  In general, all potentially mutually beneficial contracts and exchanges of property rights must 
overcome transaction costs to be implemented. Transaction costs are barriers to the formation of contracts. 
The study of transaction costs has formed the foundation of the law and economics movement and the 
analysis of institutions.
16 We have already seen how transaction costs may provide guidance with respect to 
the kinds of property rights and entitlements that should be enforced. Analysis of transaction costs is also of 
central importance in determining the nature of contracts and the forms of cooperation possible in an 
economy. Coase [1960] showed that when transaction costs are zero, resources will be allocated efficiently 
no matter how property rights are delineated (as long as they are clearly defined in the law). This of course 
uses the concept of transaction costs in a very broad and all encompassing way. The importance of Coase’s 
insight is that since transaction costs are almost never zero, and often quite high, legal rules defining 
property and contract rights will have significant effects on resource allocation.  
 
A.  Sources of Transaction Costs  
Transaction costs include the costs of searching for the right partners, measuring the attributes and 
qualities of the goods and services to be exchanged, bargaining over the terms and conditions of a contract, 
establishing appropriate monitoring mechanisms, and enforcing an agreement. As previously indicated, 
these costs are all essentially due to the high costs of information and the possibilities for opportunism. 
Hidden information and hidden actions are possible because of the inherent limitations of human cognition. 
This means that contracts are always made in an environment of uncertainty and risk. In a general market 
setting the existence of asymmetries of information may lead to adverse selection and the thinning out of 
certain markets [Akerlof 1970].  Rules to disclose information may result in fewer mistakes and the 
                                                 
16 See R. Coase, 1960. Williamson traces the notion of transaction costs to John R. Commons. See 
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overcoming of adverse selection problems. But such rules are feasible only if third parties (a court or 
government agency or arbitrator) can observe and verify whether information that is disclosed is in fact 
accurate or false and misleading.
17  
Measuring the quality of performance in a contract is often inherently complex and cannot be fully 
specified in all dimensions. Contracts always involve implicit understandings that cannot be fully specified 
and enforced. The inevitable uncertainties and gaps will lead to potential conflicts if one party does not 
meet the expectations of the other. Social norms and trust relations based on reputation and repeat dealings 
help overcome some of these problems and become increasingly important if the formal institutions of 
contract law are absent. [See World Development Report 2002, Ch. 9].  This is why bazaars in the Middle 
East and elsewhere can carry on so much business without formal contracts. The merchants, tradesmen, 
moneylenders and craftsmen seek each other out to form client-type relationships which involve repeat 
dealings, thus using personalized reputation as a means to trust each other. Some informal arbitration 
possibilities by colleagues and elders ensure participants of relatively easy settling of disputes. Outsiders 
would have a hard time breaking into this environment.
18 But these kinds of personalized transactions are 
inherently limited. Formal rules enforced by government are needed for contracts involving strangers. 
Generally these formal rules (such as widely accepted default rules or conditions for breach) should 
complement the informal rules based on the social norms of specific cultures. Such complementarities in 
laws and norms encourage the formation of more complex contracts and make it possible to overcome 
some of the moral hazard and information problems hindering the development of many markets. [WDR 
2002, Ch.9]. 
Another source of bargaining cost is the inherent difficulty of foreseeing all potential 
contingencies that might arise in an uncertain world and specifying the appropriate adjustments if such 
contingencies were to occur. If certain unforeseen contingencies occur one party might find it beneficial to 
breach or renegotiate the contract. But it may be difficult to determine if this is an opportunistic breach or 
one based on real mitigating factors which have made it impossible or impractical to carry out the contract. 
Opportunism is a danger inherent in all contracts since contracts are formed to allow reliance and other 
                                                 
17 Fraud may be distinguished from nondisclosure. Fraud is when a piece of information is deliberately 
misrepresented. Nondisclosure becomes fraud if there is a legal rule requiring that a particular piece of 
information be revealed.  
18 See Clifford Geertz, 1979.   20
specific investments that have lower values outside the contract, that is, in the market, than within the 
contract.  This creates the temptation to “hold up” the other party by threatening non-compliance in an 
attempt to appropriate more of the potential surplus of the contract.   
To maximize social wealth, the law must allow for efficient breaches of contract while 
discouraging opportunistic breaches. Efficient breach means that the sum of net gains to all the parties 
involved from breaching is positive. This often means that one party will stand to gain more from breach 
than other parties will lose. If transactions costs are low we would expect the parties to reach a mutually 
beneficial agreement and void the contract, with appropriate damage payments so that both parties end up 
better off.
19 We would want contract law to be structured so as make transaction costs as low as possible  
Analogous to the protection of property rights, courts can use a property rule or a liability rule to 
protect contracts.
20 Courts may rule for “specific performance” or require that the breaching party pay some 
damages. Specific performance is analogous to a property rule protection, while damage awards are 
analogous to liability rules. With expectation damages a contractor will breach if he is willing to pay the 
promisee an amount equal to what he expected to get out of the contract. Hence he will breach only if it 
efficient to do so, when both parties would be made better off. But determining the appropriate level of 
“expectation damages” is likely to be costly to the courts. In addition, full expectation damages might lead 
to too much reliance investment by the contractee. To prevent over-reliance and to lower administrative 
costs, damages may need to be based on the principle of “reasonable” reliance. [Shavell 2003].  Ulen 
[1984] argues that when transaction costs among the parties are low it is better for courts to require specific 
performance of the contract. The parties would then reach some mutually beneficial accommodation.  The 
ruling by the court would simply be in the form of a clarification of property rights in the contract. The 
problem is that if the parties have come to court it is probably a good indication that transaction costs are 
high. Some easily accessible, predictable and low-cost arbitration mechanism may be one means of 
lowering transaction costs.  
 
  
                                                 
19 Sometimes a party may be allowed to breach without paying damages, as in cases involving 
impossibility, frustration of purpose, or mutual mistake.  
20 See Ulen, 1984.   21
 
B. Enforcement  Costs 
High bargaining costs combined with foreseeable enforcement costs will prevent many contracts 
from being made. Enforcement costs too are due in part to inherent measurability problems. Even if 
internally observable, actions may be unobservable to third parties such as judges or arbitrators. Courts may 
also be corrupt or arbitrary basing judgments on political or personal criteria. Parties may be able to use 
seemingly legitimate arguments to breach contracts opportunistically when it is in their interests to do so. 
The law is faced with the constant challenge of devising clear rules that discourage fraudulent and 
deceptive contracts while encouraging the general formation of wealth enhancing and risk reducing 
contracts. An efficient legal rule must follow a cost-benefit criterion: Is the value of the mistakes it prevents 
(the benefits of the rule) greater than the value of the potentially valuable contracts is discourages. In 
addition there must not be any other substitute rule (or set of rules) which will produce greater net benefits.  
Thus the law should not enforce contracts which involve fraud, duress and incompetence and 
should ideally not enforce contracts which involve deception, whether deliberate or because of non-
disclosure of relevant information. But it may be hard to determine whether these conditions are met and it 
is possible that courts will go too far in granting such claims, thus weakening the position of contracts in 
general.
21 The exact boundaries that should be associated with the application of legal rules are difficult to 
specify in an exact manner. Nevertheless for developing countries which have less literate and less 
commercially sophisticated populations, and weaker information gathering institutions, a stricter 
enforcement of routine contracts but a weaker enforcement of complex contracts full of potential “unfair 
surprises” may be more appropriate.
22 The greater uncertainty in the political and economic environments 
of developing countries might make the strict enforcement of contracts both unfair and administratively 
costly. The reliance on informal arbitration mechanisms based on local cultures may be more appropriate in 
many contexts, though more formal enforcement may be required as the level of development expands.   
                                                 
21 Richard Epstein, for example, believes that courts should not expand the doctrine of unconscionability 
too far and should use it only insofar as it facilitates protecting parties against fraud, duress and 
incompetence by not requiring as much evidence to prove these transgressions. To Epstein, too wide an 
application of the unconscionability doctrine will result in the non-enforcement of many legitimate 
contracts and hence the prevention of many future mutually beneficial contracts. Epstein, pp.292-293. 
 
22 Melvin Eisenberg, pp. 301-.   22
 
C. Firms  and  Markets  
Hold-up problems and possibilities for opportunism become multiplied with more complex multi-
person contracts involving large numbers individuals requiring them to undertake a great variety of tasks 
and specific investments. Such complex contracts are often necessary to take advantage of the benefits of 
specialization, teamwork and the economies of scale and scope made possible by existing technologies. 
Sometimes resource owners may be able to overcome these transaction costs by establishing private 
organizations such as firms [Coase 1937; Williamson 1985]. The firm may be considered as a complex 
“nexus of contracts” wherein resource owners agree to follow a certain set of rules and to submit to a 
certain governance or authority structure[Alchian and Demsetz 1973; Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Williamson 1985]. The “owners” are the so-called residual claimants of the firm, putting their own capital 
at risk. As owners they get to decide on how the resources under their control are to be managed [Hart 
1989]. By forming such organizations resource owners will be able to overcome some of the specific 
transaction costs associated with pure market exchange. According to Vanberg [1994], when individuals 
join a firm, or any organization, they agree not to an exchange of goods and services but to an exchange of 
commitments to accept certain constraints on their future behavior.
23  Similarly Kreps [1984] defines a firm 
by the principles it chooses to guide its responses to unforeseen contingencies. These principles and how 
they are implemented define the “culture” of the firm and are designed to instill trust in employees who are 
asked to accept a hierarchical authority structure when joining the firm. 
An individual has authority if she can direct others to undertake a range of actions they would not 
undertake on their own initiative [Simon 1951]. Some kind of authority structure is required to coordinate 
the activities of the various members of a firm.  If there is one owner she may represent this coordinating 
authority. The owner may direct employees to various tasks, monitor their actions, and determine their 
contracts. In a small organization these functions, and the reciprocal trust of employees that authority will 
not be abused, may be relatively easy to achieve. But to take full advantage of teamwork, specialized 
investments, and economies of scale, larger and more complex organizations are often necessary.  
                                                 
23 Viktor Vanberg, 1994, p. 140.   23
To establish such enterprises it may be necessary to combine the capitals of a number of 
individuals. This can be done by pooling capital in a partnership or borrowing the needed capital. Forming 
partnerships among many people creates the familiar incentive problems associated with common 
ownership. In addition, if the firm borrows money all partners will become fully liable for the entire firm’s 
debts, significantly increasing the risk to each partner in the event of bankruptcy. Thus limited liability and 
security laws allowing the formation of corporations may need to evolve.  
For equity and credit markets to work effectively, sophisticated and uncorrupt monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms are required. Without such controls some shareholders might be able to divert 
funds to their own uses while debtors may be induced to take undue risks or practice outright corruption at 
the expense of creditors.  
When ownership is widely shared, a manager may be hired by the owners to coordinate the 
activities of the firm, monitor the performance of employees and make necessary contracts with those 
outside the firm. A centralized governance structure will need to be established.  The distinguishing 
characteristic of a governance structure is that selected agents are given discretionary authority to direct 
resources including employees to undertake tasks not specifically listed in a contract. Labor contracts in 
particular are always incomplete, implying that the employer will have discretionary power within 
specified limits to direct the employee. Governing a firm, as with any organization, involves certain kinds 
of transaction costs that are different from the transaction costs associated with market exchanges.  
Discretionary authority over internal firm resources implies that bargaining costs will be lower 
than if market contracts had to be made with each individual resource owner at every moment in time. But 
the costs of monitoring employees and obtaining information about aspects of the production process may 
be higher [Milgrom and Roberts 1990].  These particular measurement problems mean that the employees 
in various positions in the hierarchy of the firm may try to gain private advantage by misrepresenting 
information or otherwise misusing their discretionary authority.  
 
D. Influence  Costs  
Milgrom and Roberts refer to such potential private misuse of authority as influence costs and 
provide the following classification of these costs. First, managers may be able to directly misuse their   24
authority for private gain, a result of the so-called principal-agent problem. Second, given that relevant 
information for efficient decision-making is dispersed throughout the organization, lower level employees 
may try to influence the decisions of managers in a self serving fashion by providing misinformation. 
Third, owners and managers will attempt to control these influence activities by expending some of the 
firm’s resources. The time and effort that goes into influence activities takes away from potentially 
productive activities. Thus corruption and the effort to restrain corruption within the organization are part 
of the costs of central management.
24  One of the objectives of owners in establishing the rules and 
procedures of the firm involves finding ways to separate influence activities that are harmful, that distort 
and waste resources, from those that are productive. Of course, the procedures may also be designed to 
perpetuate the influence and discretionary power of the owners or managers.
25 It might be noticed that the 
imperfect information that gives rise to influence costs is the root cause of all incentive problems associated 
with organizations (as indeed it is of all common governance situations) including, most importantly, that 
of government.  
Without appropriate legal foundations, efficient-sized firms are unlikely to be formed. But the 
necessary legal institutions are themselves most often the product of government action which is itself 
subject to influence costs. Governments may enact rules that are predatory toward private enterprise or 
serve special interests with political power. Rules may also be established for perfectly legitimate reasons 
but be used in perfectly illegitimate ways. Many developing countries, including most countries of the 
Middle East, suffer from governments that have become too large, promulgating too many rules and 
regulations, regulations that become inefficient in their implementation. Governments tend to make 
property rights of large enterprises insecure through various forms of arbitrary exactions and changes in 
regulations. Thus in these countries firms tend to be small and localized, and based primarily on 
personalized exchange relationships. Such personal exchanges have low transaction costs but the costs of 
actual production are high because the gains from specialization are not realized. More sophisticated 
contracts involving larger firms and the potentially low production costs of such firms are not realized 
because the insecurity of property rights and contracts makes transaction costs too high. As indicated by 
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North, “Non-specialization is a form of insurance when the costs and uncertainties of transacting are 
high.”
26  
In many developing countries production occurs in small craft shops with low fixed costs operated 
by a master craftsman with perhaps one or two apprentices. Products are non-homogeneous, creating high 
measurement costs and uncertainty for potential buyers. Potential entrepreneurs who establish small firms 
with a minimal number of workers are faced with various constraints if they wish to expand. First is the 
very limited access to capital, a consequence of imperfect capital markets. Capital markets are particularly 
sensitive to the problems of asymmetric information and high transaction costs, and thus prone to fail in 
environments without the appropriate legal and regulatory institutions. Banks are often state-owned and 
obtaining loans for expansion involves a political process which can be cumbersome and costly. Industrial 
firms in developing countries are invariably dependent on imports of vital inputs, such as machinery and 
equipment. Access to imports is often uncertain and problematic due to uncertainty about government 
policy with respect to import licenses, import taxes and access to foreign exchange. Often it is necessary to 
have political connections to be able to import at predictable cost the inputs needed for sustained 
production. In addition, larger firms generally are subject to more strict enforcement of labor laws 
involving the provision of health insurance and restrictions on their rights to discharge workers. Potential 
entrants into the formal sector may be subject to high minimum capital requirements making it difficult to 
start up a business.
27 These and other limitations on the growth of firm size tend to mean that firms will use 
little fixed capital and will eschew contracts that are long term. Many firms will be driven into the informal 
or extra-legal economy. The only large scale enterprises viable in such an environment will be those 
politically supported or directly operated by the government.
28 
 
III. Government Regulation and Public Ownership 
  It is clear that governments play a major role in determining the kinds of economic activities that 
are undertaken in society. The transaction cost- property rights framework discussed above can be used to 
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27 According to the World Bank’s Doing Business in 2004, Middle Eastern countries have the highest 
minimum capital requirements while Latin American nations have the most rigid hiring and firing rules. 
28 Ibid. p. 65.   26
discuss the appropriate role of government under different circumstances. Government is by definition a set 
of organizations that impose rules and enforce them. Government is necessary to protect property and 
contract, to provide overall rules to regulate the use of common resources, to provide regulations to control 
commercial activities that may harm the general public (externalities and monopolies), and to provide 
services which markets and private firms and organizations will not provide, or will provide inefficiently if 
left unregulated. 
The government can be conceived as a hierarchical authority structure with multiple agendas. As a 
result it will suffer from all of the potential influence (or “rent-seeking”) costs associated with large 
organizations but on a much magnified scale. Individuals and groups in society will try to influence 
government decision-makers to pass laws or perform tasks that will benefit them personally, often at the 
expense of others, all under the pretext that the public interest will be served. They will claim that these 
government actions will prevent private sector inefficiencies (fraud, monopoly, externalities, and imperfect 
information problems) or that government services are needed because the private sector cannot provide 
them efficiently. The effects are often exactly the opposite of what is claimed. 
Because of these influence activities, governments are often too large with intrusive and 
unnecessary regulations in some areas even as other areas are left unregulated and ripe for private sector 
fraud and monopolization. Many enterprises will be driven into the underground economy operating under 
their own evolving extra-legal rules and norms [DeSoto 1989 and 2000]. The firms that remain in the 
formal sector will be bogged down trying to comply with or circumvent the cumbersome rules of the 
bureaucracy. Only those firms with influence and political connections will be able to do well in this 
environment. Often the government ends up undertaking the direct production of goods and services that 
would have been best produced by the private sector, even as the production of needed public goods is 
ignored.  
An important point to note is that there is no unique size of government. It is how government 
does what it does, rather than the scale of its activities, which helps determine the productivity of an 
economy.
29 Does the government provide the regulatory mechanisms to prevent fraud and monopolistic 
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practices, and to reduce transaction costs, or do its actions contribute to and increase these harmful 
practices and costs? Well functioning markets generally require sophisticated regulatory mechanisms and 
some kind of social safety net to protect those exposed to inevitable market volatility. Failure to provide 
these regulations and safeguards may lead to major market failures and political disturbances.
30 The lack of 
adequate regulatory institutions may have been responsible for what Rodrik [1999] calls the “dismal 
failures” of privatization in Russia during the 1990s.  Russia’s privatization during the 1990s was carried 
out hastily and without sufficient government regulation, and thus led to widespread monopolization, 
corruption and inefficient (and unfair) market outcomes. Similarly the absence of adequate social safety 
nets may have been the cause for the backlash against price reforms in Latin America during the 1980s.
31 
Capitalism can only thrive if there is some trust in government institutions and confidence that the 
regulatory apparatus will work effectively. Unstable regulatory environments invite corruption as different 
groups invest in rent seeking or influence activities in an attempt to subvert regulations in their own favor. 
In cases where the regulatory mechanisms are weak, private groups might even invest in private 
enforcement of their own rules or in attempts to buy off state officials and judges. 
Glaeser et al [2002] argue that the degree of corruption and regulatory uncertainty might also be 
due to inequalities of wealth. Inequalities of ownership of resources allow the rich to manipulate 
government institutions, including government agencies, legislatures and the judiciary, to obtain favorable 
laws, regulations and interpretations of regulations and laws.
32 In such cases those without influence will be 
unlikely to be able to raise capital or want to invest because their investments will be subject to regulatory 
expropriation. In such circumstances, investment will be undertaken only by small influential elites.
33  
DeSoto’s proposal for legitimizing the “informal” sector, by giving formal property right protection to 
squatters and informal businesses operating outside the current legal system, may help in this regard by 
reducing inequality, promoting legal competition and bolstering the rule of law (so long as steps are taken 
to prevent a “race for property rights” as new squatters flood into public or unclaimed properties).  
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Economies dominated by corrupt private elites are inherently unstable and susceptible to the 
emergence of populist movements. Political entrepreneurs might be able to use the discontent with the 
existing elites to implement redistributive policies toward the poor.
34 This, in turn, will destabilize the 
private sector, especially its more transparent, organized segment. Large enterprises might in fact be taken 
over by the state and run as state owned enterprises perhaps to prevent monopolistic abuse or perhaps to 
protect employees of the firm. Managers may be chosen on the basis of political patronage rather than 
managerial expertise. Losses by firms may be covered by the government budget. None of this is conducive 
to productive investment.    
 
Government versus Private Ownership  
The question of government or private ownership of large enterprises presents a major dilemma 
for developing countries. It is commonly agreed that the government should provide public goods, merit 
goods, other goods with large positive externalities, goods that are natural monopolies, and goods which 
the private sector might not provide competitively. Having decided on government provision, a decision 
has to be made about whether the good or service should be provided directly “in-house” by government 
employees or indirectly through government contracts with private contractors. Shleifer [1998] wants to 
use current theories of ownership and contracting to answer this question. Such an analysis might provide 
the theoretical rationale for privatizing state operated firms such as steel, energy, telecommunications and 
financial services that has taken place in many developed and developing countries over the past 20 years.  
Note that many of these industries were originally state operated because they were considered natural 
monopolies or it was felt that the private sector would not be able to raise sufficient capital due to imperfect 
and severely underdeveloped capital markets.  
Consider first the case of a government that is benevolent, knows exactly what it wants to 
accomplish and is able to specify its multiple dimensions in a contract. If such a complete contract could be 
devised, negotiated and enforced at zero cost, there would be no difference between direct government 
provision and contractual provision.  This follows from a simple application of the Coase theorem to 
government contracting. But in all real world situations such complete contracts and regulations cannot be 
                                                 
34 See the interesting recent works by Amy Chua [2003] and Rajan and Zingales [2003].   29
written and enforced due to the measurement and verification problems discussed previously. Whether 
direct government provision or government contracting is more efficient depends in large part on the 
significance of these “non-contractible” quality dimensions [Shleifer and Vishney 1997; Shleifer 1998].  
Private ownership of assets provides better incentives for investments to improve productivity and 
lower costs. Innovations and quality improvements will also be more forthcoming so long as they are 
observable to government agents responsible for monitoring the contract and so long as the profits from 
these actions are not usurped through further government regulation and renegotiation.
35 If the political 
system is perceived to be unstable and subject to stochastic regulatory changes, private incentives will be 
weakened and government ownership may become more attractive. Even in a stable regulatory 
environment the cost cutting incentives of private ownership may adversely affect those aspects of quality 
which are unobservable or unverifiable [S&V1997]. Here “strong incentives may lead to inefficient 
outcomes and soft incentives might be better.”
36 Government management’s lower incentives to hold costs 
down may actually be a good thing in this context.  Shleifer [1998] argues, however, that even with these 
conditions private ownership might still be preferred if innovation is an important component of the 
industry and the value of innovations can be observed ex post. Similarly if some competition can be 
introduced into the system, perhaps from imports, or if consumers are able to judge quality and resist 
purchases of mediocre products or services, then the incentives for inefficient cost reduction will be less.
37   
Thus government contracting with private producers is to be preferred if four conditions are met. 
First, the opportunities for unobservable quality reductions must be low. Second, innovation must be an 
important consideration. Even though it seems that innovation is always important, its importance varies 
with the nature of the product and the technological potentialities associated with the product or service. Of 
course it might not be easy to determine ex-ante which products have technological potentialities. Third, 
the potential for competition and hence the ability of consumers to effectively discipline the producers must 
be relatively high. And fourth, creation and maintenance of reputation must be an important consideration 
for the managers of private firms with government contracts.
38 
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Of course government objectives are not always benevolent and the possibilities for influence 
activities mean that the decision-makers of government agencies might be susceptible to doling out 
government contracts to influential political supporters. But under such circumstances privatization might 
also be susceptible to corruption. If the state is corrupt due to too much influence activities, it will be a bad 
producer but also a bad regulator and privatizer [Djankov el al 2003]. In summary, privatization of state 
owned enterprises may lead to more efficiency and reduced corruption only if there is a strong and 
accountable regulatory apparatus, including anti-trust, in place, strongly supported by commonly shared 
political beliefs and cultural norms. If these formal and informal institutions do not exist, the process is 
likely to lead to monopolization and corruption. Even more corruption may result if new private owners 
gain influence over the government’s imperfect regulatory apparatus through bribes and favors.  
 
IV. Culture, Religion and Property Rights 
  Legal rules, property rights, and contract law are more easily implemented and enforced if the 
general public is aware of them and places some credence in their moral validity. Under such conditions, 
the fairness of activities is more easily accepted, and disputes and violations of property rights are less 
likely. Much current research shows that laws that are compatible with local norms are easier to enforce 
with higher levels of compliance and fewer disputes.
39 It seems reasonable to conclude that where possible 
written law should be in conformity with social norms.
40 
  But what happens when there is a conflict between local norms and the needs of a complex market 
economy? In such cases, laws may have to deviate from norms to some extent. Fortunately social norms are 
rarely unidimensional and rigid. The multiplicity and interpenetration of beliefs and customs creates some 
flexibility in norms and the possibility for change over time. Thus “good laws” can serve as foundations for 
new norms, just as good norms can serve as the foundation of good laws.
41 There is a continuous 
interaction between formal public rules (laws and regulations) and the rules created by non-state actors 
(social norms and conventions). Religion is the basis of many norms in society providing an ethical 
foundation for behavior. Much of the common law and civil codes of developed countries is based on the 
                                                 
39 See Buscaglia and Ratliff, 2000; Djankov et. al. 2003; DeSoto, 1989 and 2000. 
40 See also K. Mechlum, pp. 328-330. 
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ethical codes emerging out of religious beliefs. Nevertheless, in developed countries a tradition of law and 
courts independent of direct religious intervention has evolved. Thus their legal traditions have developed a 
greater flexibility in coping with modern commercial and industrial conditions.
42  
  In developing countries legal systems are generally not as well developed. Many countries have 
transplanted laws from western, more advanced, countries. This might be a low cost way of developing a 
legal system, but such transplantations often require a long process of developing the human and 
institutional capacity to implement and enforce the laws. The public must understand the law, and lawyers, 
prosecutors and judges must be trained. Such a process might be quite costly, especially if there is 
resistance among various groups about accepting the legitimacy of the new transplants. The potential 
conflict between domestic cultural norms and externally derived laws may be illustrated by a brief look at 
the struggles for legal legitimacy in many Islamic countries. 
 
 
Legal Legitimacy in Islamic Countries   
  In recent decades, a revival of religious feeling in many parts of the Islamic world has increased 
demands among many that the Sharia, or Islamic law, should replace existing legal systems that in many 
cases are thought to be based on legal transplants and non-Islamic precepts. Opponents of this view feel 
that the Sharia will offer too rigid a code, incompatible with modern commercial and financial 
requirements, or that it is too ambiguous to serve as a basis for modern law. Many of these controversies 
are similar to what took place in the West before the advent of the modern era. But it may perhaps be easier 
for Islamic doctrine to adjust to the legal requirements of complex modern economies. The Sharia, for 
example, provides a somewhat sophisticated body of commercial rules which may act as a foundation for 
commercial law. Lawmakers in Islamic countries may be able to benefit from such a foundation without 
succumbing to “hard line” interpretations of the law.          
The Sharia has rather complex rules about ownership and contract and, as is the case with all 
systems of law, interpretations of the substance of these rules have frequently been in conflict, allowing a 
measure of flexibility in the evolution of the legal systems based on them. All bodies of law are always 
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incomplete and potentially contradictory inasmuch as precise and unambiguous rules for all contingencies 
can never be written. As circumstances change, reinterpretations and adjustments are always made through 
commonly accepted procedures. In the case of Islamic law there are many established procedures within 
the religious institutions of different countries for interpreting laws, resolving disputes and establishing 
authority. The sharia was historically developed in a commercial environment and is thus quite sensitive to 
the requirements of commerce. As such, it may provide a good normative foundation for the legal system 
of countries whose populations are prone to see Islamic-based laws as more legitimate than legal 
transplants from abroad. Sometimes legal transplants can be made compatible with sharia law. This was 
what was attempted in Iran during the Reza Shah period (1921-1941) when a civil code was introduced 
which attempted to codify the law but make it consistent with customary and Islamic law. That attempt 
seemed to have been a success at the time even though many religious figures decried the perceived 
secularization of the law and later, after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, tried to replace the civil code with 
a more hard-line Islamic version, something they have not been entirely successful in doing. 
The Sharia recognizes various forms of property and places restrictions on each. Private property 
(melk) is recognized in the sense of a complete and exclusive right to use or dispose of a resource so long 
as it does not significantly harm other properties.
43 Different kinds of usufructs and how they can be 
disposed are defined. Legitimate and illegitimate means of obtaining possession are recognized. For 
example, legitimate ownership can be obtained by the cultivation of “dead lands,” through contract and by 
inheritance or bequest. Theft and usurpation would be illegitimate ways of acquiring property. Property 
legitimately acquired cannot be arbitrarily expropriated. Of course, in unstable political environments, such 
as the period after the Iranian Revolution, legitimacy of acquisition could be used as a pretext to destabilize 
the entire system of existing property rights.  
Resources which have no ownership are described including public property (melk al-amma) such 
as the air, waterways and public roads. According to Schacht “everyone is entitled to use (public property) 
in a way which does not cause prejudice to the public.”
44 The importance of these public resources is 
recognized and given much attention in the sharia. An example may be the stipulations with respect to 
water. According to Islamic law water cannot be bought and sold, but the channels through which the 
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waters flow and the right to use it may be sold.
45 The restriction on the sale of water is traced to a saying of 
the Prophet. An Islamic jurist, Abu Yusuf interprets this prohibition to apply only to water that has not been 
placed in a receptacle. The resource water comes from various sources including big rivers, smaller rivers, 
canals and underground aquifers. Big river water is theoretically open to all. Canals may need to be dug to 
irrigate lands but the amount of water diverted may be limited to the extent that it harms the positions of 
other lands. Priority and restrictions on use may be placed based on circumstances and needs.
46   
Islamic law also recognizes an important category of property known as waqf or pious foundation. 
Properties are removed from private ownership and made inalienable with their revenues devoted to some 
public or charitable purpose including the support of mosques and religious schools. Waqfs may even be 
established to support the descendents of the founders. Waqfs are managed by agents called mutavallis 
appointed by the founder or his beneficiaries and overseen by reputable clerics. Mutavallis are paid out of 
the profits of the waqf and are considered to have a fiduciary responsibility to carry out the wishes of the 
founder. Detailed rules exist for how waqfs should be administered, how its revenues are to be used and 
even how changes can be made in the use of revenues in case the original intent of the founder becomes 
invalidated or socially useless [Kuran 2001]. Evidently much thought has been given to the principal-agent 
problem in the administration of waqf properties. Nevertheless the possibility of dissipation and misuse 
always exists in situations where the actions of agents cannot be easily observed or verified.   
Historically many waqf were established by wealthy individuals for a variety of reasons. 
Establishing waqfs enhanced the social prestige of the founders and increased their reputations for piety 
and trustworthiness. Waqf would be less likely to be confiscated and helped shelter the other assets of the 
founders from potential confiscation by present or future rulers. Establishing waqfs may also have been a 
way for influential people to legitimize their ill-gotten gains.
47 By reducing the probability of confiscation, 
expected returns from investments in other properties would be increased and investment in these other 
properties would likely increase, but investment in the waqf property could go up or down depending on a 
variety of circumstances. Kuran believes that the prevalence of waqf in many Islamic societies during the 
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period of European expansion may have “locked up” too many resources and hindered the growth potential 
of those societies by preventing sale and transfer and thus the pooling of resources to take advantage of 
economies of scale and scope made possible by changing commercial and industrial possibilities. In 
addition the inflexibility in the mission of the waqfs may have contributed to the perpetuation of activities 
which had long outlived their usefulness and social productivity.  
During the 19
th and early 20
th centuries governments seeking more revenues and political control 
tended to confiscate more waqf properties and placed important waqf under government supervision.
48 
Nevertheless the Waqf has remained an important category of property. Though they are no longer the 
main provider of public goods (this function having been taken over by municipal and central governments) 
waqf are still established to support charitable causes including relief to the poor, the provision of no-
interest loans to the needy and support of hospitals, mosques and Islamic schools. The concept of waqf has 
been expanded to include financial assets and provides for the pooling of the financial assets of large 
numbers of people in pursuing given public purposes. Waqfs are similar to non-profit organizations in 
western countries pursuing missions that pure profit maximizing firms might not pursue as well. They serve 
a useful social function and may even be a means to promote civil society by taking assets outside of the 
taxing authority of the government and designating revenues to purposes not necessarily  encouraged by 
government.  
The Sharia also has well developed rules relating to commerce and contracts. Here a principal 
concern seems to be a desire to prevent dishonest and unjustified enrichment. Many of these restrictions 
also exist in different variations of Western law. Here too the conditions under which contract may be 
considered illegitimate and thus unenforceable are spelled out. The increasingly broad interpretation of the 
doctrine of unconscionability in American law has greatly expanded the extent of prohibited or 
unenforceable contracts. In Islamic law too there is great concern about preventing fraud and duress and 
other ways in which one party may take advantage of another party. Note that while these prohibitions 
seem designed to promote justice, they may also have an efficiency rationale if properly interpreted.  The 
prohibition against usury (reba) in the Sharia is one prohibition which existed in early Christian doctrine 
but which is now so narrowly defined in Western law that it is no longer a constraint for credit and 
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commercial transactions. This seems to still be a problem for countries that wish to follow the Sharia. 
Nonetheless Islamic scholars and bankers and merchants have devised many ways of getting around this 
prohibition.  
Contracts that involve reba or interest are considered to be illegitimate or haram. This simply 
means that there should be no reward for time preference under risk-free situations. This does not 
necessarily mean that credit markets cannot function. The creditor must become a partner with the debtor. 
Thus he may share in the profits and losses of the enterprise undertaken by the borrower. The concept of a 
sleeping partnership (mozaraba) can be used to circumvent the prohibition against reba as have many types 
of complex and somewhat obscure implicit contracts.
49 Interest has also been justified by some Islamic 
scholars as a compensation for service.
50 In practice different financial instruments have been created that 
effectively allow the earning of interest by banks and their depositors. The question that can be legitimately 
asked is whether the special contracts needed to get around the prohibition against reba increase transaction 
costs to a degree that significantly reduces the performance of capital markets. North believes that breaking 
down the prohibition against usury in Western countries was a major factor in the development of modern 
capital markets.
51  
Contracts should also be free of excessive risk (gharar) and gambling or pure speculation 
(ghemar). Islamic scholars have identified the specific conditions for each of these which would make a 
contract void. Contracts should also be free from manipulations and the creation of artificial shortages due 
to hoarding (ehtekar). Transactions should be free of misrepresentation and information vital to a 
transaction must be revealed. All these conditions may be interpreted in ways that are consistent with the 
norms of economic efficiency.
52  In particular, there is the doctrine of maslahah or “necessity” (the 
principle of the supremacy of the public interest) allows interpretations of the law and regulations which 
serve the interests of the Islamic community. Many liberal Islamic scholars have advocated using the 
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doctrines of maslahah, talfiq (or synthesis) and ejtehad (or learned innovation) for interpreting the Sharia in 
a way as to make it consistent with “modern” commercial requirements.
53 The point is that there is enough 
flexibility to make the laws compatible with efficiency norms. In particular if such rules are understood by 
the public and acceptable to them, then enforcement costs will be lower than otherwise and trade, 
specialization and the formation of the special contracts necessary to form productive organizations can be 
facilitated.  
 
V.   Empirical Applications  
  The framework presented in the preceding sections is in the tradition of the new institutional 
economics and law and economics. In this framework institutions are defined as the informal and formal 
rules (or norms, customs, laws and regulations) specifying, enforcing and restricting the rights and 
obligations of individuals with respect to specific resources. Institutions determine the constraints faced by 
individuals and therefore structure their incentives to undertake productive or predatory actions.  
This theoretical framework predicts that “good” property rights institutions will reduce the 
transaction and production costs associated with productive activities leading to increased investment and 
growth while “bad” property rights institutions will increase these transaction costs and push resources into 
socially unproductive and defensive uses.  In general terms improvements in the quality of property rights 
(both the clarity of those rights and their enforcement) will reduce the costs of productive actions and 
promote efficient investments through various interconnected channels. 
  The challenge, of course, is to go beyond general statements on the growth-enhancing nature of 
property rights and to test this theoretical framework in a variety of concrete contexts. Has the empirical 
literature been up to this challenge? Many illuminating empirical studies have been undertaken to discover 
the exact importance of different institutional arrangements on investment and growth. These studies may 
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A.  Cross- Country Studies Using Aggregate Indices 
The first category of studies uses different aggregate indices of institutional quality and economic 
performance to econometrically estimate the importance of institutions. Many of these studies have been 
concerned with trying to determine the relative importance of institutions as compared to economic policies 
or geographic endowments [Rodrik et al 2002]. Before the different influences could be sorted out, 
reasonable indices or proxies for institutional quality, good policy, and geographic endowment had to be 
obtained.
54 These proxies by necessity are always somewhat arbitrary, perhaps based on surveys and 
perceptions, making it difficult to identify all of the complex causal relations among different variables. 
Despite this Rodrik et al [2002] have effectively demonstrated that institutional quality (measured in 
different ways) is highly correlated to different measures of economic performance including GDP per 
capita, growth and growth volatility. They also find that there is an important correlation between good 
policies (such as greater openness to international trade, stronger domestic competition and stable 
macroeconomic policies) and good institutions. The sustainability and economic effects of good policies 
seems to depend on good institutions. Institutions are thus more important than policies or geographical 
endowment in determining growth. In fact, policies did not seem to have any independent influence on 
growth, and “geography” seemed to have weak effects. The effectiveness of good policies seemed to 
depend on the existence of good institutions. Institutions, on the other hand, were an independent 
determinant of performance and not simply the consequence of higher incomes or better policies.
55  
Easterly and Levine [2002] obtain similar results from their econometric analyses. Geographic endowments 
seem to affect performance only through their effects on institutions while policies do not have any 
independent effect on income or income growth [IMF 2003]. These studies provide some general 
confirmation for the institutionalist theory. Nevertheless, the results should be interpreted with caution due 
to aforementioned measurement problems associated with finding adequate proxies for the various 
theoretical variables and the econometric problems associated with disentangling the complex causal 
relations among the variables.  
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  The empirical findings just discussed tell us little about what the actual optimum structure of 
property rights should be. As should be clear by now, a property rights regime consists of more than just 
the protection and enforcement of private property rights. Different property rights regimes might produce 
equally good (or bad) results under different political and cultural circumstances. For example, during the 
1990’s Russia’s economy performed relatively poorly compared to that of China, even though Russia had 
instituted a legal regime based mainly on private property rights while China still had a legal system with 
many fundamentally socialist features. Nevertheless the relative absence of predictable judicial 
enforcement in Russia meant that private investors felt insecure whereas the Chinese government seems to 
have provided sufficient protection to encourage large investments by private entrepreneurs. Similarly, 
good performance seems to be possible under different institutional structures. The institutions of advanced 
high income countries still have major differences in terms of the role of the public sector, the nature of the 
legal systems, the types of corporate governance or the social insurance mechanisms that prevail.
56 
    
B.  The Comparative Institutional Approach  
A second approach used to understand the impact of institutions is the comparative institutional 
approach which tries to take advantage of what may be called historical experiments to demonstrate the 
relative importance of different institutions in particular circumstances. Two or more countries with similar 
initial economic, political and legal conditions may have pursued different paths with respect to specific 
aspects of their overall institutional structure. The more similar the initial situations the more reliable the 
comparisons may be. Johnson and Shleifer [1999] use this method to support their hypothesis that stronger 
regulatory mechanisms will often improve outcomes when the costs of private litigation are too high due to 
difficulties of verification (of fraud) and incompetence or corruption of courts. They show how different 
regulatory approaches affected the performance of securities markets in the Czech Republic and Poland. 
These countries had similar historical and geographical situations. Both had similar communist 
backgrounds, both were freed at about the same time, and both followed market orientated policies 
beginning in the 1990’s. By carefully describing the similarities and trying to control for relevant 
differences (for example by explaining why particular differences would be irrelevant to the effect they 
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were trying to measure) Johnson and Shleifer show that the stricter regulatory system established in Poland 
was more successful in preventing fraud and corruption than the freer, less regulated system established in 
the Czech Republic. They conclude that when the legal system is weak and the transaction costs of private 
agreements and private litigation are high, it may be more appropriate to have strong regulatory agencies 
overseeing certain markets to ensure that consumers (shareholders and creditors in this case) are not 
defrauded. They thus support the theory that under certain circumstances, regulations which restrict the 
range of allowable contracts, may actually improve the market and expand private opportunities for making 
valuable investments.  
  Similar comparative institutional analyses are carried out by DeSoto and his colleagues at the 
Instituto Liberdad y Democracia. Their thesis is that unstable regulatory environments and the absence of 
effectively enforced “formal” private property rights (that is, “bad” institutions), will lead to much 
unproductive rent-seeking and protective activities and inefficient investments. These studies devote 
considerable effort to measuring the costs of earning a living or doing business according to the complex 
maze of regulations imposed by the government. They show that these unreasonable costs force people into 
the “informal” sector which operates according to its own rules and customs but is basically inefficient. The 
lack of formal recognition and protection of property rights leads to great inefficiencies despite the great 
pool of talent and potential wealth that exists in the informal sector. Those who control assets informally 
will not make long term investments and cannot use their assets to form complex and long term contracts 
with others.  
 
C.  The Micro-Econometric Approach    
The last approach we will discuss is what may be called the microeconomic- econometric 
approach. Microeconomic models are created showing the various channels by which property rights affect 
investment. These models are then estimated and tested econometrically. Besley’s [1995] impressive study 
of the importance of private property rights in Ghanaian agriculture is indicative of this micro-econometric 
approach. Besley builds several micro models describing how changes in property rights, moving from 
more communal to more private rights, will affect investment by farmers. His models show the different 
ways private property rights will potentially affect investment: by increasing security against expropriation;   40
by allowing land to be used as collateral for borrowing, thus reducing the cost of borrowing and increasing 
investment; and by allowing the transfer of land to those who value it more. In addition he considers the 
possibility that private rights might be endogenous in the sense that farmers who invest more in their land 
end up acquiring more permanent and transferable rights. Besley notes that there is no necessary 
connection between more private rights and investment. For example it is possible that individuals in 
villages are altruistic towards fellow villagers or that communal sharing rules may allow better 
internalization of potential externalities.
57 Communal rights might be just as secure, or transferability rights 
might not be a significant for improving efficiency. He uses data on two regions of Ghana obtained through 
surveys of farmers asking them to indicate the various property rights they feel they possess and the 
investments (such as planting trees) that they have made in a given period on the lands they control. 
Farmers are asked to indicate whether they have the right to sell, rent, mortgage, pledge, bequeath, or gift 
their lands, and whether or not they need approval of the lineage in order to exercise each of these rights. 
From this survey he creates an index of private property rights and proceeds to test his various hypotheses. 
The results from Wassa County seemed to support the idea that stronger private rights improve investment. 
The results from Anloga County also showed such a link but the results were not robust and were 
somewhat inconclusive. Measurement and econometric problems, of multicollinearity and simultaneity for 
example, could be responsible for this inconclusiveness.   
Overall, Besley is unable to find any strong support for any particular theory about how exactly 
property rights affect investment. In particular he finds little support for the collateral-based argument. His 
general conclusion is that advocating the creation of greater private property rights should be done with 
caution and is not a panacea for all that ails “low-growth” agriculture. This ambiguous conclusion is 
consistent with other studies which show that increases in private rights increase productive investment 
only when producers have access to complementary markets and communal resources. For example, an 
empirical study of Thai farming showed that titling (representing an increase in security and transferability 
of rights) increased investment only when there was access to credit markets.
58 Of course, titling could in 
the longer term improve collateralization and thus the emergence of a credit market.  
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There are many other scenarios where the expansion of private rights might not promote 
productive investment. If private rights are created for land while insurance markets remain undeveloped, 
poorer farmers might be made more vulnerable to risk and thus be induced to take risk-mitigating but 
productivity-reducing investments. A similar negative impact on investment might occur if politically 
powerful elites are able to obtain private rights at the expense of small farmers operating within relatively 
effective communal arrangements involving traditional usufructs. Many studies have shown that larger 
farms under the control of landed elites are less productive than smaller ones, principally because they will 
need to rely on hired labor entailing higher monitoring costs. Absence of accessible credit markets and high 
transaction costs will prevent the transfer of land to more productive (smaller) farmers. In addition, unequal 
property ownership based on political power usually has other adverse effects on the security of property 
rights. Landed elites are more likely to be able to induce the government to implement discriminatory laws 
and institutions favoring themselves and reducing the opportunities of smaller producers.
59  In fact there is 
increasing evidence that great inequalities of ownership rights generally weaken overall property and 
contract rights and thereby reduce the incentives for productive investments [Keefer and Knack 2000]. On 
a more general level, powerful interests with well established positions in various closed markets might be 
able to oppose the creation of free market institutions, thereby maintaining their privileged, monopolistic 
positions. Rajan and Zingales [2003] point to these “incumbent” groups as often opposing the development 
of competitive financial markets, preferring the repressed financial systems that ration credit to the 
privileged while denying it to potentially innovative but property-less entrepreneurs.  
The growth of private rights might also be harmful if there are possibilities of significant negative 
environmental externalities. Here, higher private investment might be accompanied by greater overuse of 
open access or unregulated common resources leading to reduced returns in the future [Lopez 2002]. More 
secure and transferable private rights might under certain conditions lead to the weakening of the social 
norms and governance mechanisms controlling the use of common and environmental resources, and thus 
lower private investment returns. However private ownership rights will have a much more positive impact 
on investment when credit markets are well developed (or can become more developed because of the 
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possibility of using land as collateral), when governance controls on necessary communal resources are 
maintained, and where significant environmental externalities are absent.
 60  
More theoretical and empirical studies of the types described are needed to discover the complex 
cause and effect links between property rights, different kinds of complementary (or conflicting) 
institutions and investment. It is important that measures and proxies for property rights and institutions be 
based on a realistic theoretical framework that recognizes the complex nature of property rights and the 
multidimensional ways in which different kinds of property rights can affect incentives for different kinds 
of productive and non-productive (or redistributive) activities. Such proxies are inherently difficult to 
construct and must rely on painstaking surveys of the participants or on widely known features of the 
institutional environment. This is what was essentially done by Besley. With better and more context-
specific data, more accurate tests can be conducted to determine how changes in specific property rights 
institutions implemented in various cultural and environmental contexts will affect different kinds of 
investments. Ultimately, which policies and institutions will promote and which will hinder growth-
enhancing investments will depend on the existing cultural, political and economic circumstances of 
particular societies. Policies and institutions that are effective in specific societies under particular 
historical circumstances may not be effective in other societies with widely differing social norms and 
administrative capabilities.  
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